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The world is continually demanding more effective and intelligent solutions and 
strategies to combat adversary groups across the cyber defense landscape. Cyber Threat 
Intelligence (CTI) is a field within the domain of cyber security that allows for 
organizations to utilize threat intelligence and serves as a tool for organizations to 
proactively harden their defense posture. However, there is a large volume of CTI and it 
is often a daunting task for organizations to effectively consume, utilize, and apply it to 
their defense strategies. 
In this thesis we develop a machine learning solution, named RedAI, to 
investigate whether open-source intelligence (OSINT) can be effectively integrated into a 
working approach that accurately classifies cyber threat intelligence. By focusing on 
open-source and easily available resources, RedAI demonstrates how to use the 
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) (OASIS, 2017) language to objectify, 
collect, and integrate intelligence and align it to the MITRE ATT&CK framework 
(MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, 2021). To test the accuracy of this solution, machine 
learning models were built using training data and then further tested with test data to 
determine the model's effectiveness at classifying unknown threat intelligence. The 
results showed that RedAI could, with high accuracy, use OSINT cyber threat 
intelligence data to build a machine learning model and then classifying unknown test 
threat intelligence. Based off these findings, it is apparent that organizations have the 















In today’s cyber world, it is evident how difficult it is to prevent attacks. Advanced 
Persistent Threats (APTs) have grown their capabilities to factors that make it hard to 
detect and investigate security breaches. The cyber security space is an increasingly 
complex industry, which reflects the growing threat landscape. Today, adversaries have 
developed advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow them to 
dynamically change their posture while evading commonplace defense mechanisms 
(Recorded Future, 2019).  
In the threat environment today traditional cyber defense mechanisms no longer 
suffice. Adversary behaviors have become industry-grade and require matching advanced 
mechanisms by organizations to effectively mitigate risk across their threat landscape 
(Bromander, 2017). By strategically incorporating cyber threat intelligence (CTI) 
practices, an organization can enable itself to make proactive, informed, data-backed 
decisions to combat APTs. While understanding the benefits of CTI is often accepted 
across the industry, applying it in practice can be a difficult and inefficient task. Threat 
intelligence is often overwhelming and historically does not follow standardized formats. 
Because of this, consuming and sharing threat intelligence can be difficult, which in 
return can cause organizations to forego its use. By applying effective technological 
methods like machine learning and ontologies, utilization of threat intelligence can 
become a viable strategy for cyber threat mitigation (Crowdstrike, Kurt Baker, 2021).  
An ontology is a set of concepts and categories in a subject area or domain that shows 
their properties and the relations between them (Gronberg, 2019). Implementing a cyber 





• Lack of methods to define relationships between layers of intelligence to leverage 
a wholistic and useable viewpoint of attack scenarios. Analysis of siloed 
information without use case relationships is not enough for organizations to 
proactively prepare for wide and evolving threats. 
• Non-standardized objectivation of intelligence information and data constructs 
leading to hardships in consumption and sharing of information. Since 
organizations have not agreed on a standardized representation of CTI, it makes it 
difficult to consume their intelligence with one another, which has proven to be 
essential in fighting APTs. 
• Data overload due to the volume of information being captured. Adversary TTPs 
create a vast amount of information making it difficult for security analysts to 
manually analyze, demanding a more automated and efficient solution. 
This thesis introduces a machine learning approach to cyber threat intelligence that 
highlights the benefits CTI can provide when machine learning practices are used to 
analyze and classify open-source intelligence (OSINT). This work evaluates different 
strategies and use-cases to find efficient and real-world focused methods to proactively 
mitigate threats. While doing so, explicit focus has been placed on incorporating and 
utilizing industry standards like MITRE ATT&CK and STIX to call attention to the 
importance of effective and structured strategies for intelligence consumption and 
sharing. 
1.1  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 





1. How can the MITRE ATT&CK framework serve organizations as a cyber 
threat intelligence (CTI) ontology? 
2. Can open-source intelligence (OSINT) be a viable method for collecting and 
consuming cyber threat intelligence (CTI)? 
3. Can machine learning prove to be an accurate and efficient method for 
harnessing the benefits of a cyber threat intelligence ontology? 
To answer these questions, this thesis demonstrates a working solution developed with a 
cyber threat intelligence focus by processing open-source intelligence data using a 
machine learning pipeline. 
 
1.2  METHODOLOGY 
For this thesis, we developed a working solution called RedAI. RedAI is built with a 
microservice focused design that can silo each of its components into programmatic 
services. RedAI was developed using Python 3 with accompaniment from the Scikit 
Learn (Scikit-Learn) and Pandas (Pandas) Python libraries for machine learning and data 
representation functionality. The cyber threat intelligence ontology was developed in 
parallel from the works and findings of the MITRE ATT&CK framework (The MITRE 
Corporation, 2021). Open-source intelligence data from the MITRE ATT&CK repository 
was utilized using the Structured Information Expression (STIX) serialization and 













2. RELATED WORK 
  Related work for this thesis falls into three main categories: Cyber threat 
intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), and machine learning. In the following 
sections, we will review each of these topics briefly. In Chapter 3 we will demonstrate 
how all three are combined in RedAI to automatically classify CTI data. 
2.1 CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE (CTI) 
Currently, for organizations to provide proper cyber security risk mitigation, they 
must develop many different strategies and approaches to combat the increasingly 
complex adversary threat field (The MITRE Corporation, 2018). Part of the solution is 
utilizing Cyber Threat Intelligence. 
FireEye defines cyber threat intelligence as the following: 
"Evidence-based knowledge about adversaries – their motives, intents, capabilities, 
enabling environments and operations – focused on an event, series of events or 
trends, and providing a decision advantage to the defender." 
 
Through this definition, CTI has a strong focus on adversaries and their behaviors, 
due to attacks and defense actions being executed because of human interaction. By 
taking this approach to defining CTI, it enables a high-level focus on the attackers 
themselves rather than the low-level techniques that they use. By doing so, this enables 
organizations to implement proactive defenses based on their adversary’s intents and 
capabilities. 
For CTI, FireEye defines the difference between information (which often is not 
actionable) and intelligence (which often includes content which makes it actionable). 





signature. These alone may help an organization in its defense, but that information is too 
low-level to form an intelligence-drive defense posture. Intelligence includes information 
but has added analysis, evaluation, relation, and context. This can include how malware 
is used from a strategic standpoint, an APT's preferred set of malware tools, the types of 
industries an APT target, and so on (FireEye, 2021). 
Below is a table comparison provided by FireEye that shows the different 
properties of information and intelligence (FireEye, 2021). 
TABLE 1 INFORMATION VS. INTELLIGENCE 
Information Intelligence 
Raw, unfiltered Processed, sorted 
Unevaluated Evaluated and interpreted by an analyst 
Aggregated from virtually every source Aggregated from tailored, reliable sources 
May be true, false, misleading, relevant 
or irrelevant 
Accurate, timely, complete as possible, 
assessed for relevancy 
Not actionable Actionable 
  
CTI requires a contextual perspective and has a strong focus on analyzing the 
results and effectiveness of the information that sits within that intelligence. This can 
include past, present, and future tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Further, the 
relationships between each defined piece of information may be linked together and 
mapped to create a visual representation. 
There have been efforts to develop cyber threat intelligence frameworks to better 





frameworks is the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which provides a globally accessible 
knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations 
(The MITRE Corporation, 2018). Through ATT&CK, specific threat models and 
methodologies can be developed to be used across the entire industry and community. 
The purpose of ATT&CK is to allow sharing of CTI in an effective and open manner that 
allows for better security across the industry. 
ATT&CK, considered to be one of the leading industry standards for CTI 
frameworks, was originally developed to improve detection of adversaries by utilizing 
data and analytics. Throughout these efforts, there were four main issues that ATT&CK 
sought to highlight: 
• Adversary behaviors. Focusing on adversary tactics and techniques allowed us to 
develop analytics to detect possible adversary behaviors. Typical indicators such as 
domains, IP addresses, file hashes, registry keys, etc. were easily changed by 
adversaries and were only useful for point in time detection — they did not represent 
how adversaries interact with systems, only that they likely interacted at some time. 
• Existing lifecycle models that did not fit. Existing adversary lifecycle and Cyber Kill 
Chain concepts were too high-level to relate behaviors to defenses — the level of 
abstraction was not useful to map TTPs to new types of sensors. 
• Applicability to real environments. TTPs need to be based on observed incidents to 
show the work is applicable to real environments. 
• Common taxonomy. TTPs need to be comparable across different types of adversary 





It is apparent how the objectives of ATT&CK align with how FireEye defines CTI. 
By focusing on adversaries, rather than low-level tactics, common and standardized 
models can be built to be tailored to real-world use cases and aligned with data and 
analytics. By focusing on these key themes, MITRE has found that intelligence focused 
solutions can be developed that provide more effective strategies to defense postures 
across the globe.  
 
2.2 OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) 
There are many different forms of data and intelligence throughout the world's 
technological ecosystem. Because of this vast array of data, there are many different 
methods that can be used to gather the data and develop intelligence. The following are 
the industry defined intelligence gathering disciplines: 
TABLE 2 INTELLIGENCE GATHERING DISCIPLINES 
Discipline Abbreviation Description 
Human Intelligence HUMINT Gathered from a person. 
Geospatial Intelligence GEOINT Gathering from satellite and aerial photography 
or mapping/terrain data. 
Measurement and 
Signature Intelligence 
MASINT Gathered from an array of distinctive 




OSINT Gathered from open sources. 
Signals Intelligence SIGINT Gathered from interception of signals. 






Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is the most broadly defined, and widely used, form 
of intelligence (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2007). It is often misunderstood and 
improperly used throughout technological solutions. According to U.S. public law, open-
source intelligence has the following characteristics (Richelson, 2016): 
• Produced from publicly available information. 
• Collected, analyzed, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience. 
• Addresses a specific intelligence requirement. 
The main characteristic is that it is publicly available, meaning that anyone can 
consume the information. It further allows for collecting, analyzing, and making 
decisions based on the OSINT in an intelligence context. OSINT sources can be divided 
into different categories based on the source of information (Richelson, 2016): 
TABLE 3 OSINT CATEGORIES 
Category Examples 
Media Newspapers, magazines, radio 
Internet Online publications, blogs, social media 
Public Government Data Reports, budgets, websites, directories 
Professional and Academic 
Publications 
Journals, conferences, academic papers 
Commercial Data Commercial imagery, assessments, and 
databases 






Within the realm of cyber security, OSINT can be gathered from many different 
sources: social media and blog posts, threat reports, and identified threat objects like 
malware.  
OSINT collection can be achieved in two ways, passive or active. Passive 
collection is performed by using threat intelligence platforms to combine threat feeds into 
a single location for consumption. Active collection is performed by using techniques to 
query specific targets of information. Active collection is best utilized when the use-case 
is very specifically defined. 
Cyber threat intelligence sources are the origin that the intelligence you have 
collected came from. A feed is a collection of intelligence from many sources typically of 
the same type of intelligence. These open-source feeds can be queried and consumed, 
which allows for them to be directly built into solutions and systems (Recorded Future, 
2017). 
Further, an intelligence platform is the system that organizes feeds into a stream 
of intelligence. These platforms pull intelligence from OSINT feeds making it more 
efficient for consumption across many different areas. These platforms can deliver feeds 
via serialized methods like STIX or TAXII (OASIS, 2017). Lastly, there are intelligence 
providers which are the organizations or entities that produce intelligence. An example of 
a provider, applicable to this thesis's work, is the MTIRE ATT&CK repository. 
Open-sourced platforms are relatively new within the cyber security field but 
provide great benefits to the community. These benefits allow thousands of feeds to be 





around open-sourced platforms, consumers can have access to large amounts of data that 
have already been organized and serialized, which allows the heavy lifting of OSINT data 
collection to be mitigated and streamlined (Recorded Future, 2017). 
 
2.3 MACHINE LEARNING 
Machine learning (ML) is the study of computer algorithms that improve 
automatically through experience. ML is classified as a subset of artificial intelligence 
(AI). ML algorithms work by building models on training data to make predictions 
without being explicitly programmed to do so. ML algorithms can be applied to an 
extremely wide variety of use cases but are best suited for scenarios where it is difficult 
or inefficient to develop conventional algorithms to perform the desired tasks (Géron).  
FIGURE 1 MACHINE LEARNING SOLUTION DEVELOPMENT (GÉRON) 
 
The benefits of machine learning are typically best realized when the problems at 





machine learning algorithms are efficient at solving complex problems that may contain a 
lot of data or need to be able to adapt to new data (Mitchell, Machine Learning, 1997).  
Machine learning solutions can be broken down into two types: supervised or 
unsupervised. Supervised machine learning relies on labeling data which is fed into the 
algorithm that includes the desired solution. It maps an input to an output based on 
supplied examples. It does this by analyzing a set of training data and produces an 
inferred function that can then be used for mapping new examples. From here, the 
algorithm can generalize from the supplied training data to unseen situations, which can 
be measured statistically by evaluating the generalization error (Mitchell, Artificial 
Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Third Edition, 1997). 
Unsupervised machine learning is when the data is not tagged or labeled. The idea 
is that the algorithm will self-organize itself and capture patterns within the data and 
perform clustering strategies to make predictions. The focus of this thesis is on 
supervised learning, as OSINT data suits this strategy best (Géron). 
For supervised learning, there are a wide variety of algorithms that can be chosen, 
each with their own strengths and weaknesses. No algorithm works best for all tasks and 
it is vital that different algorithms are considered and have their effectiveness evaluated 
to the problem at hand. 
The most widely used supervised learning algorithms are: 
• Support-vector machines 
• Linear regression 





• Naïve Bayes 
• Linear Discriminant analysis 
• Decision trees 
• K-nearest neighbor algorithm 
• Neural networks 
• Similarity learning 
Along with determining the best algorithm for a problem, there are other factors 
to consider. Bias-variance tradeoff is the process for determining the threshold based on 
training data sets to combat bias and variance. The prediction error is related to the bias 
summed with the variance. If an algorithm exhibits low bias, it may be more flexible, and 
it can fit each training set of data differently which causes high variance. Further, it is 
important to determine the amount of training data used which is to be considered in 
comparison with how complex the true function is. In other words, if the true function is 
simple, an inflexible (high bias) algorithm can learn from a small amount of training data. 
If the data is very complex and has many different behaviors or interactions, a large 
amount of data is required with a flexible algorithm (low bias) (Géron).  
Noise also needs to be considered when developing a machine learning solution. 
If the output has low accuracy (often incorrect) then the algorithm should not find a 
function that exactly matches the training examples. If the data is fit too closely it causes 






A key part of a supervised approach is feature engineering. This is the process of 
selecting the features within your data to train on. For example, if your data is animals, a 
feature would be "type of animal" which could equal "cat". Your features should be 
relevant to the task at hand. Features can be extracted which is the process of combining 
features to produce more useful complex features to train on (Stanford University, 2019).  
Finally, machine learning solutions need to be tested and validated. To build a 
learning model, it is best to split your data into two sets, a training set and test set. A 
typical ratio is 80% training data and 20% test data; however, this can be tailored to fit 
the problem and algorithm. If there is a low training error and high generalization, 
overfitting is typically occurring (Géron). 
Implementing a working machine learning algorithm can be challenging. Below is a 
typical framework to follow when designing a solution: 
1. Frame the problem at hand 
2. Collect data 
3. Explore the data to gain insights 
4. Prepare the data for use with ML algorithms 
5. Explore and evaluate different learning models 
6. Fine-tune the model 
7. Evaluate the solution 
Because of the nature of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for this thesis, natural 
language processing (NLP) must also be considered. NLP is used to understand structure 





computer to under the contents of a natural language data source. Through the analysis of 
syntax, semantic, pragmatics, and morphology, machine learning algorithms can be built 
to solve problems related to human language (Bird, 2009). 
Natural language processing allows for many benefits to be realized through a 
machine learning solution. Including: 
• Performing large scale analysis such as unstructured text data 
• Automate processes in real-time 
• Tailoring NLP tools to the task like criteria and industry-specific language 
Natural language processing is performed by transforming text into associates that the 
model can understand. This process is called text vectorization. Statistical analysis is then 
used to build a dictionary to determine which features best represent the identified text. 
The more language data fed into a NLP algorithm, the better the analysis will be (Yse, 
2019). 
One of the key steps in NLP is tokenization. This process is conducted by breaking 
unstructured text into tokens that can then be used for model development. Through these 
tokens, text can be used in an objectified programmatic sense and fed into the solution. 
Another way of thinking of this is "building meaning" from the text. 
Lastly, when dealing with large amounts of unstructured text it is important to 
perform certain procedures to make sure that the text being fed into the machine learning 
model is as clean as possible. In other words, we do not want to feed in unnecessary data 





steps to be performed in an NLP pipeline (Geitgey, 2018). The result are data structures 
representing text that are then fed into the machine learning algorithm. 
• Sentence segmentation: break apart unstructured text into separate sentences. 
• Tokenization: break sentences into separate words. 
• PoS Tagging: guessing the part of speech (noun, verb, adjective). 
• Lemmatization: identifying different word forms. 
• Stop Word Removal: removing filler words (ex: "and", "the", "a"). 
• Dependency Parsing: how words relate to each other. 
• Noun Phrases: grouping words that represent a single idea. 
• Named Entity Recognition: label nouns or real-world objects. 
• Coreference Resolution: (optional) identifying related words based on context. 

















For this thesis we developed a working, real-world focused, solution that can test, 
evaluate, and answer the research questions that have been posed. This working solution 
has been named RedAI and was developed using the Python 3 programing language 
along with accompaniment from numerous Python libraries. By building a working and 
demonstrable product, this thesis is able to clearly articulate its findings in a dynamic and 
testable manner. Further, this method of research allows others to further develop the 
work and evaluate the findings themselves. Lastly, this solution allows these findings to 
be dynamic and not statically locked in time. The data used throughout the solution can 
be modified for different use-cases or time-related evolution. 
Code for this work has been released under an open-source license and can be 
accessed at the GitHub repository: 
https://github.com/lukeanoel/redAI/tree/main/redAI 
 
3.1 CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 
3.1.1 MITRE ATT&CK OVERVIEW 
To realize CTI into RedAI's design, the MITRE ATT&CK framework, 
specifically MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, was utilized as a foundation. MITRE 
ATT&CK can be leveraged as a taxonomy as well as a useful data repository. ATT&CK 
for Enterprise is an adversary model and framework for describing the actions an 
adversary may take to compromise and operate within an enterprise network. By utilizing 
the model, an organization can characterize and describe post-compromise behavior that 





research as well as penetration testing and red teaming. The result is a knowledgebase 
that characterizes activities adversaries use against enterprise networks (The MITRE 
Corporation, 2021). 
MITRE ATT&CK represents a large knowledge base of adversarial techniques 
which are offensively oriented actions performed by attackers. As outlined in previous 
sections of this thesis, the focus is on adversary behavior, not on low-level details like 
malware and tools themselves, but on how they are used within context. Techniques are 
organized into a set of tactics that explain each technique. Techniques provide details on 
how the technique works which provides context. 
Tactics explain the "why" of a technique. This is the objective or goal the attacker 
has in-mind when performing an action. Tactics are high-level contextual categories. 
While techniques represent "how" an attacker achieves an objective (The MITRE 
Corporation, 2018).  
One of the key features of ATT&CK that is used in this thesis is the relationship between 
tactics and techniques. This relationship is visually demonstrated via the ATT&CK 
Matrix. 
Example: The tactic Persistence contains techniques including Account Manipulation, 
BITS Jobs, and External Remote Services. Each one of these techniques can be used to 





FIGURE 3 MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX 
  
Further, techniques can be broken down into sub-techniques which describe how, 
in more detail, the behaviors are performed. For the sake of this thesis, there were no 
distinctions made between techniques and sub-techniques, all techniques were treated 
equally. 
 
3.1.2 ATT&CK & CTI INTEGRATION 
One of the key benefits of using ATT&CK as a framework is its ability to 
integrate with cyber threat intelligence (CTI). ATT&CK's repository contains 
documented information on adversary group behavior profiles which are developed from 
open-source intelligence. Groups are then further documented by how they have used 
techniques in real-world scenarios to achieve their goals. These instances are classified as 
procedures. Analyzing procedures allows proactive defense by seeing how adversaries 
performed in the real-world, which allows organizations to trace their steps and 





By integrating a solution with ATT&CK, we can make use of its data repository 
of cyber threat intelligence. Within this repository, is a large collection of information 
following the ATT&CK Matrix. MITRE makes all this information openly accessible via 
their website or by accessing it through their maintained GitHub repository. This 
information has been collected by MITRE from many different sources and centralized 
into one location. This information has been analyzed, vetted, and tied together under the 
wholistic intelligence approach (The MITRE Corporation, 2021). 
This allows for anyone to be able to query the ATT&CK repository for a specific 
adversary group (or all groups) and find the techniques they have used throughout their 
observed actions, as well as the names of tools and malware they have used. Further, each 
one of these breakdowns provides a detailed description of how the group specifically 
used the technique or tool within that identified scenario. These descriptions have great 
value and serve as the foundation for this thesis's work. 
For example, MITRE has defined Group APT1 as having a description of: "APT1 is a 
Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, 
commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398." 
Further, ATT&CK then contains the 20 different types of techniques that APT1 
has been observed using. These techniques then give a detailed description tailored to 
APT1's use case. An example of how APT1 has used the technique System Service 
Discovery in the real-world: “APT1 used the commands net start and tasklist to get a 





ATT&CK also contains the known types of software that groups have been found 
to be using. Software consists of tools as well as malware. Each piece of software within 
ATT&CK also has its own description so that the consumer can get a better description 
of the software. More importantly, ATT&CK maps the techniques that each piece of 
software realized tailored to the specific group. That is, software can realize many 
different techniques, but for cyber threat intelligence it is important to know how each 
group specifically uses the software. 
RedAI utilizes the following ATT&CK concepts: Techniques, Mitigations, 
Groups, and Software. Tactics are not considered as they are too high level for any real 
analysis. 
ATT&CK consists of several different concepts to objectify its data repository. 
Below is a table outlining those concepts. Each concept has a respective ID variation that 
is used to identify concepts. This is ID is unique to each object within a concept (The 
MITRE Corporation, 2021). 





Technique Represent “how” an adversary achieves a tactical objective by 
performing an action 
Txxxx 
Mitigation Represent security concepts and classes of technologies that 
can be used to prevent a technique or sub-technique from 
being successfully executed 
Mxxxx 
Group Known adversaries that are tracked by public and private 
organizations and reported on in threat intelligences reports 
Gxxxx 
Software Represent an instantiation of a technique or sub-technique. 








3.1.3 STRUCTURED THREAT INFORMATION EXPRESSION (STIX) 
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) is a method in which to share 
cyber threat information. Historically, sharing information has proven to be inefficient 
and unstandardized. Information exchanged between providers and consumers is often 
inconsistent and expresses little detail and flexibility. Because of these factors, it is often 
hard to consume the information and integrate it into existing systems or solutions. 
Because of this, the industry has relied heavily on unstructured text exchanges for 
intelligence sharing, which has obvious difficulties for machines to understand. STIX 
aims to enable widespread consumption of information by providing common 
mechanisms for addressing threat information (OASIS, 2017). 
STIX, by design, is an openly developed language for the characterization and 
communication of standardized cyber threat information. Through this language, cyber 
threats can be analyzed, specified, and shared in a unified fashion. STIX's design allows a 
large set of threat information to be collected, including:
• Cyber observables 
• Indicators 
• Incidents 
• Adversary TTPs 
• Exploit targets 
• Courses of Action 
(remedies or mitigations) 
• Cyber Attack Campaigns 
• Cyber Threat Actors 
(adversaries or groups) 
  
STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) allow for the actual relationship building and 
sharing of cyber threat intelligence. Each SDO contains property and relationship 
information. Property information includes common properties (type, ID, labels, etc.) and 













TABLE 5 STIX DOMAIN OBJECTS 
Name Description 
Attack Pattern A type of TTP that describe ways that adversaries attempt to 
compromise targets. 
Campaign A grouping of adversarial behaviors that describes a set of malicious 
activities or attacks (sometimes called waves) that occur over a period 
of time against a specific set of targets. 
Course of 
Action 
A recommendation from a producer of intelligence to a consumer on the 
actions that they might take in response to that intelligence. 
Grouping Explicitly asserts that the referenced STIX Objects have a shared 
context, unlike a STIX Bundle (which explicitly conveys no context). 
Identity Actual individuals, organizations, or groups (e.g., ACME, Inc.) as well 
as classes of individuals, organizations, systems or groups (e.g., the 
finance sector). 
Indicator Contains a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious 
cyber activity. 
Infrastructure Represents a type of TTP and describes any systems, software services 
and any associated physical or virtual resources intended to support 
some purpose (e.g., C2 servers used as part of an attack, device or server 
that are part of defense, database servers targeted by an attack, etc.). 
Intrusion Set A grouped set of adversarial behaviors and resources with common 
properties that is believed to be orchestrated by a single organization. 
Location Represents a geographic location. 
Malware A type of TTP that represents malicious code. 
Malware 
Analysis 
The metadata and results of a particular static or dynamic analysis 
performed on a malware instance or family. 
Note Conveys informative text to provide further context and/or to provide 
additional analysis not contained in the STIX Objects, Marking 




Conveys information about cyber security related entities such as files, 
systems, and networks using the STIX Cyber-observable Objects 
(SCOs). 
Opinion An assessment of the correctness of the information in a STIX Object 
produced by a different entity. 
Report Collections of threat intelligence focused on one or more topics, such as 
a description of a threat actor, malware, or attack technique, including 





Threat Actor Actual individuals, groups, or organizations believed to be operating 
with malicious intent. 
Tool Legitimate software that can be used by threat actors to perform attacks. 
Vulnerability A mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to gain 
access to a system or network. 






TABLE 6 STIX DOMAIN OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS 
































campaign targets identity malware targets identity 
campaign targets vulnerability malware targets vulnerability 
campaign uses attack-
pattern 
malware uses tool 
campaign uses malware malware variant-of malware 































indicator indicates campaign threat-
actor 
uses tool 
indicator indicates intrusion-set tool targets identity 
indicator indicates malware tool targets vulnerability 
indicator indicates threat-actor       








Below is an example visualization of a relationship between multiple SDOs. In 
this example, a Campaign is being attributed to a Threat Actor, both of which were 
indicated by an Indicator. That campaign then targets a Vulnerability. 
  
FIGURE 4 IDENTIFYING A THREAT ACTOR STIX EXAMPLE (OASIS-OPEN, N.D.)
 
  
Below is an example of a specific attack-pattern form of spear phishing that references 
CAPEC. As shown, there are three SDOs, one for the attack-pattern, one for the intrusion-set 













"name": "Spear Phishing as Practiced by Adversary X", 
"description": "A particular form of spear phishing where the attacker claims that the 


























3.1.4 STIX & MITRE ATT&CK 
This section describes how this thesis programmatically uses MITRE ATT&CK's 
data repository by implementing and extending the STIX format. ATT&CK can be 
enabled by STIX by using some predefined STIX objects as well as creating some 
custom STIX objects. Below is a table mapping ATT&CK concepts to the STIX Object 
type used throughout this thesis's work. Note, that the STIX language version 2.1 
contains more object types than mapped below. However, these are the only object types 






TABLE 7 ATT&CK TO STIX MAPPING 
ATT&CK 
Concept 




Sub-technique Attack-pattern where x_mitre_is_subtechnique = true 




Software Malware or Tool 
  
While ATT&CK maintains unique IDs for each object in its repository, each 
STIX objects also possess a unique ID. These IDs are unique and allow for effective 
retrieval and reference to STIX objects programmatically. These IDs are different and 
need to be treated as such (The MITRE Corporation, 2021). 
Relationships are the key component to relating ATT&CK objects to one another. 
This is performed by utilizing the STIX Relationship object. Relationships convey a 
wholistic picture of events and allow for a more informed intelligence posture. Below is 
an example of a relationship scenario. In this example, the relationships between a 
specific group, it is used tools/malware, the techniques performed, and the corresponding 
mitigations are shown (The MITRE Corporation, 2018). Within the box images are the 
name of the corresponding STIX object. Relationships cannot be revoked; however, they 
can be considered revoked if one of the objects they reference is revoked. This factor is 
important in the event groups, mitigations, techniques, or tools become deprecated and no 





a description field, which contains unstructured text information that provides context to 
the relationship between the objects (OASIS, 2017). 
  




3.2 OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 
For the work in this thesis, OSINT is focused on the collected material within 
MITRE ATT&CK's data repository. This repository is globally accessible to anyone and 
can be viewed via their website. This intelligence has been gathered for use by the private 
sector, government, and cybersecurity product and service community (FireEye, 2021). 
This information is routinely maintained and kept up to date. Further, MITRE strives to 
make sure the information and resulting intelligence is of high quality and centralized to 






MITRE's intelligence within ATT&CK is a result of much of their own efforts 
and research as well as dozens of different well-known entities within the cyber security 
industry. With these factors in mind, MTIRE and ATT&CK are highly beneficial OSINT 
resources to take advantage of for this work. 
 
3.2.1 COLLECTION 
MITRE makes the ATT&CK data repository globally accessible by anyone. This 
information can be viewed manually via their website which also allows for the 
possibility for web scraping. MITRE also makes all their data accessible via a maintained 
GitHub repository. Through this repository they have all the data categorized by 
ATT&CK concept in STIX format which can be easily downloaded via JSON files. 
These JSON files contain the bundle of STIX SDOs which contain all needed 
information for the work in this thesis (descriptions, names, ATT&CK IDs). 
For the work of this thesis, the JSON files were downloaded and integrated into 
the working RedAI solution. The following table breaks down the figures for data 
obtained from the data repository (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, 2021). 
TABLE 8 ATT&CK DATA COLLECTED 











The ease it which it is to collect this amount of valuable intelligence highlights the 
benefits of working with ATT&CK. This large amount of collection was performed 
seamlessly while following industry standardized formats that can be flexibly integrated 
into the solution. 
  
3.2.2 CONSUMPTION 
With the cyber threat intelligence collected in STIX format, programmatic 
methods were developed to convert this format into more usable data constructs to 
integrate with machine learning libraries. To do this, each ATT&CK object's 
corresponding STIX SDO was processed, with desired fields extracted. After this 
process, fields were extracted from the STIX SDOs that were required for this work. 
These fields include ATT&CK type, ATT&CK name, and description. 
After extraction, all the data is stored in CSV format since most machine learning 
libraries take CSVs as input. 
 
3.3 A MACHINE LEARNING SOLUTION 
There were numerous key libraries utilized throughout this work to provide 
machine learning and natural language processing functionality. These key libraries are 
highlighted in Table 9. 





Scikit-learn is an open source machine learning library that supports 





model fitting, data preprocessing, model selection and evaluation, and many 
other utilities. 
Pandas Pandas is a fast, powerful, flexible and easy to use open source data analysis 
and manipulation tool, 
built on top of the Python programming language. 
NLTK NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) is a leading platform for building Python 
programs to work with human language data. 
 
3.3.1 APPROACH 
With the intelligence now collected, and the cyber threat intelligence architecture 
understood, the next step is developing a solution to demonstrate the research. The issue 
at hand is being able to demonstrate how machine learning can be utilized to effectively 
classify cyber threat intelligence. To get to this result, certain qualities of the intelligence 
need to be analyzed. 
Each ATT&CK object obtained contains a type (Group, Technique, etc.) along 
with an unstructured text form description. This description is going to be the key feature 
used to build the machine learning models. These descriptions define each ATT&CK 
object in detail and link them to a real-world observation (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, 
2021). 
FIGURE 7 EXAMPLE GROUP DESCRIPTION 
[APT19] is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, 
including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high 
tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign 
was used to target seven law and investment firms. Some analysts track  and 
[Deep Panda] as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if 
the groups are the same. 
 





[CARROTBAT] is a customized dropper that has been in use since at least 2017. 
has been used to install and has infrastructure overlap with. 
 
The goal of the machine learning solution is to be able to take in cyber threat 
intelligence data, and by analyzing the unstructured text of their descriptions, be able to 
accurately classify what type of ATT&CK object the intelligence falls under. 
 
3.3.2 SYSTEM DESIGN OVERVIEW 
Figure 9 shows the system design overview highlighting the entire pipeline of 
RedAI. This view shows how RedAI utilizes a microservice architecture approach to 
achieve its execution. Further, this overview shows the roles of each service as well as 












3.3.3 DATA EVALUATION 
A great deal of unstructured text data has been gathered from the MITRE 
ATT&CK repository. Evaluating this data is a key step and being able to prepare it 
efficiently to be used to build the machine learning models. Further, it is important for 
any machine learning solution to fully understand what your data represents and contains. 
Data is the foundation of any machine learning solution, and without a good grasp of the 
data the solution is set up for failure.  
TABLE 10 ATT&CK FEATURES OF FOCUS 
ATT&CK 
Name 
ATT&CK Type Description 
The name of 
the ATT&CK 
object 
The classification of the 
ATT&CK object (Group, 
Software, etc.) 
The unstructured text field explaining 
contextual information about the 
ATT&CK object. This field can be just a 
sentence to multiple paragraphs. 
  
This data evaluation process is a key enabler of the data cleaning process to be 
performed. By analyzing the data obtained, we can see that there are many unwanted 
pieces of text data.  Figure 8 is an example of a Group's (Axiom) description extracted 
from the ATT&CK repository in raw form of text with spaces removed. 















This example is a good representation for all the raw unstructured text that was 
collected by ATT&CK. As can be seen, there are many characteristics of this data that 
are not of value for building the ML models. For starters, URL reference links to either 
MTIRE's website pages or to external references do not provide contextual value. While 
important to know the sources of data, it does not provide any machine learning 
tokenization value. Next, any references to citations are not needed for the same reasons. 
Lastly, it was noticed that same malware descriptions have code samples or references. 
The unstructured text denotes this code using HTML tags like <code>. These tags are not 
valuable, however the text inside the tags is. Lastly, throughout this work it was deemed 
necessary to convert all text to Unicode UTF-8, as some of the data pulled in was in an 
improper format. 
Another important realization was that some ATT&CK objects collected had 
empty descriptions. These provide no value and are a hindrance to the solution, as the 
remaining solution pipeline is expecting for there to be unstructured text information. 
Other key evaluation notices are that there can sometimes be unstructured text references 
to the group itself, other groups, other aliases, or possible malware used. These are 
acceptable to leave in the unstructured text as they provide contextual information that 
will help build better models for that specific ATT&CK type. 
3.3.4 DATA CLEANING & PREPARATION 
After the data collected from MITRE ATT&CK has been evaluated appropriately, 
the data can now be cleaned and prepared to build models with. For this approach, the 
entire MITRE repository will be used to develop training and test sets of data. The 





the accuracy of the model. Currently, it is not important to know the training and test 
ratios, but it is important to know where those sets are coming from. Further, it is 
important to know that when creating those data sets, the sets will be created using a 
random approach, so that all data is treated equally. 
To begin cleaning the data, RedAI iterates through the stored data checking for 
empty description fields as well as duplicates. If any of these are found, they are 
removed. The next step is to utilize regular expressions (regex) to remove all URLs, 
citation references, and ATT&CK references. Also using regular expressions, all possible 
<code> HTML tags are removed as well as new line and indentation tabs like '\n' and '\t'. 
After all this is complete, the text is converted to Unicode UTF-8 format. After this 
process is complete, RedAI is left with clean looking data that is intelligence focused. 
After this initial cleaning, more general machine learning cleaning methods are 
applied. To begin, all words are converted to lowercase, all punctuation is removed, and 
stop words are removed. Stop word removal is important as stop words provide no added 
value to the sentences themselves but are only needed to formulate English language 
continuity. These are common words such as "a", "an", "the", and "in". The entire list of 
stop words used for this work was referenced by the NLTK's list of English stop words. 
After all this cleaning has been performed across the data, the data is stored for 
later use to build the machine learning models. Below is a figure plot showing the totals 





FIGURE 11 ATT&CK DATA OBJECTS COLLECTED 
 
 
3.3.5 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
To be able to answer the research questions effectively, this thesis places a strong 
focus on evaluating different strategies throughout the development of the machine 
learning solution. These strategies include the train/test ratio, NLP procedures, and the 
type of algorithm deemed the best fit. 
Model development begins by following a bag of words approach towards our 
data. Bag of words is taking in each document of unstructured text and ignoring the 
placement of the words and placing an emphasis on frequency. For this work, Term 
Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) is used. TF-IDF is a statistic to reflect 
on the importance of a word within a collection. TF-IDF value increases as a word 
appears more often in a document but is offset by the number of documents that contains 
the word. This helps adjust for words that generally appear more frequently across the 





FIGURE 12 TERM FREQUENCY FORMULA 
 
A TF-IDF vector is calculated using the Scikit-Learn library with the following 
properties: 
• Sublinear_df set to True to use logarithmic frequency 
• Min_df is the minimum amount of documents a word must be present in to be 
kept, which is set to 3 
• Norm is set to 12, ensuring all feature vectors have a euclidian norm of 1. 
• Ngram_range is set to (1,2), this allows for consideration of both unigrams and 
bigrams 
FIGURE 13 TF-IDF VECTORIZER 
TfidfVectorizer(sublinear_tf=True,min_df=3,norm='l2',encoding='latin-1',ngram_range=(1,2)) 
 
The next step in the process is to transform the Description feature of each 
ATT&CK object into a vector of numbers. This assists with training supervised 
classifiers. This gives a vector representation of the text, which allows us to train unseen 
ATT&CK objects to make predictions on which ATT&CK type they fall under. After 







3.3.6 MODEL EVALUATION 
The next step in model development is to benchmark different types of models and 
evaluate their accuracy. The four models that will be benchmarked are: 
• Multinominal Naïve Bayes 
• Logistic Regression 
• Linear Support Vector Classification 
• Random Forest 
This evaluation process included splitting the original ATT&CK dataset into the 
training and test sets, developing the model using the SciKit-Learn Python library, and 
evaluating the accuracy between all the models. Further, a combined boxplot and strip 
plot approach was used for each ATT&CK category to determine the accuracy focuses on 
the category per model. The accuracy is determined by feeding in the description features 
of the test data set into each model, knowing where they belong, and seeing how accurate 
the model classifies them (Géron). 
For high-level analysis, it is sometimes important to analyze the most common 
unigrams and bigrams for each type of classification within the training set. This gives an 
overview of some common features, but also would indicate issues in data collection or 
cleaning if there are noticeable features that are not of value.  
TABLE 11 MOST COMMON UNIGRAMS & BIGRAMS 

























   






FIGURE 15 MITIGATIONS BOX PLOT 
 
  






FIGURE 17 SOFTWARE/MALWARE BOX PLOT 
 
  






As can be identified from the box plots shown above, the variation in accuracy 
between each ATT&CK category is very limited, meaning that the mean accuracy for 
each model for each ATT&CK category show no indication of certain categories creating 
outlying results within certain models. This is as expected as the structure of data is 
unstructured text, and each category followed the same text cleaning procedures. 
To begin, the Naïve Bayes model was evaluated.  Naïve Bayes is a family of 
probabilistic classifiers based on Bayes' theorem. This classifier places a significance on 
the independence between features (McCallum, 2019). For this work, the Multinominal 
Naïve Bayes approach was used. As can be seen, Naïve Bayes performed similarly to 
Logistic Regression except at a slightly lower mean accuracy of .831703.  
Next, Random Forest algorithm was evaluated. Random Forest operates by 
constructing multiple decision trees and then classifying the data and outputting the class 
that is the mode of the classes (classification) or mean/average prediction (regression) of 
the individual trees (TK, 1998). This model performed the weakest of all the algorithms; 
however, it did have the less variance in accuracy with no outliers. 
Following, Logistic Regression was evaluated. Logistic regression is a statistical 
model that in its basic form uses a logistic function to model a binary dependent variable, 
although many more complex extensions exist. In regression analysis, logistic regression 
estimates the parameters of a logistic model (Tolles, 2016). This model performed well at 






Lastly, Linear Support Vector Classification (SVC) was evaluated. Linear SVC is 
similar to SVC, but it is implemented in terms of lib-linear, giving it more flexibility in 
the choice of penalties and loss functions and should scale better to large numbers of 
samples (Scikit-Learn). As can be noticed, Linear SVC had the highest mean accuracy of 
all the models and had a weakness to only one noticeable outlier for each ATT&CK 
object. 
After performing these evaluations, Linear SVC was chosen as the best 
performing model to use for this research. All work performed here after is under the use 
of the Linear SVC model algorithm. 







Random Forest .695300 
 
3.3.7 SOLUTION EVALUATION 
While the previous section analyzed the results of our machine learning 
implementation, it is important to utilize this result and compare it to the wholistic 
problem at hand. In this section, the results will be analyzed at a lower level, still leaving 
the larger conclusion to be presented in a later section. 
  As can be seen in the figure below, most of the predictions made by our model 





predictions are being accurately categorized with our model. However, as can be seen 
throughout there are some misclassifications. 
  
FIGURE 19 MODEL PREDICTION ACCURACY HEATMAP 
 
The only ATT&CK category with many misclassifications are the number of 
predictions that are being classified as relationships when in reality they are malware. In 
this case, it can be useful to analyze the descriptions of these malware types and try to 














Malware Relationship  is malware that was injected into a signed ver... 
Malware Relationship is a loader component that has been observed l.. 
Malware Relationship  is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid devel... 
Malware Relationship  is a malware platform that uses a modular appr... 
Malware Relationship steals banking information through man-in-the-... 
Malware Relationship is a software suite and network that provides ... 
Malware Relationship is a malicious DLL that has been used by  duri… 
Malware Relationship is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed... 
Malware Relationship  is a malware-as-a-service offered on the darkw... 
Malware Relationship  is a loader crafted to be launched via abuse o... 
Malware Relationship can be used to find or change information with... 
Malware Relationship is a Trojan used by  to remotely execute 
comma... 
Malware Relationship is a kernel-mode  that attempts to add victims... 
Malware Relationship is a Web shell. It has been modified by  actor… 
Malware Relationship  is a signature backdoor used by  that is capab... 







Certain assumptions can be made after reviewing the text that was misclassified, 
but none of these can be for certain. First, these descriptions have two or one subjects, 
which is a common feature that can be expected from relationships. Next, these typically 
are more text heavy and have a connection between what the malware does and how it 
has been used in the real world, again another feature of what we expect from 
relationship descriptions. 
Lastly, it is important to evaluate the final scores from all the ATT&CK types. 
Below is a classification report with the following analysis points: precision, recall, f1-
score, and support. Precision shows that for each prediction for each ATT&CK type, how 
often did it pick the correct one. Notably, groups and courses of action were predicted 
with 100% precision, with the other types not far behind. Highly precise categories can 
most likely be attributed to how unique their description feature is compared to the other 
types. Recall is the percentage of all the types used for testing that were correctly placed 
in their right classification. All performed well, however malware preformed the worst at 
85%. This can be attributed to how diverse in features malware descriptions were. This 
makes sense due to the many different types of malware as well as use cases. 
Next to analyze are the f1-scores. F1-scores are the harmonic mean of the 
precision and recall. This can serve as a good indicator of a total score, which all the 
categories reflect 90% or above. Lastly, the support column is the number of instances 
used for each ATT&CK category for testing. As a reminder, our train/test ratio was 






TABLE 14 SOLUTION PREDICTION RESULTS 
ATT&CK Type Precision Recall F1-score Support 
Group 1.00 0.89 0.94 28 
Malware/Software 0.95 0.85 0.90 107 
Technique 0.99 0.99 0.99 98 
Relationship 0.95 0.99 0.97 349 
Course of Action/Mitigation 1.00 0.92 0.96 52 
  
Further, the scores were compared with one another by calculating the averages. 
In total, 634 ATT&CK objects were used for testing the machine learning model, and we 
were met with highly accurate results with an average f1-score of 0.96. These scores are 
even further highlighted by the fact that the text for each ATT&CK type came from the 
same source, which typically results in less accurate results as the unstructured text can 
be bias to the author and hard to differentiate. Below is a table showcasing our results, 
along with the macro-average of the scores as well as a weighted average as the different 
types had different amounts of objects. Lastly, all these results can be easily replicated by 
anyone by utilizing the RedAI solution with this data or by experimenting with their own. 
  
TABLE 15 WEIGHTED SOLUTION SUMMARY RESULTS 
  Precision Recall F1-score Support 
Accuracy n/a n/a 0.96 634 
Macro Average 0.98 0.93 0.95 634 














4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
4.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
 
Research Question 1 - How can the MITRE ATT&CK framework serve 
organizations as a cyber threat intelligence (CTI) ontology? 
  
The work in this thesis took a deep dive into the topic of cyber threat intelligence 
and the current landscape in which organizations can consume and share this intelligence. 
MITRE ATT&CK serves as a framework for describing post-compromise behavior that 
has been observed in the wild. By utilizing MITRE ATT&CK, organizations can take 
advantage of the research and intelligence gathering performed by a well-known 
organization and model it across their own enterprise. 
  ATT&CK provides an ontology that allows organizations to focus on high-level 
adversary behavior instead of low-level details. ATT&CK organizes techniques into sets 
of tactics that provide context to the situations. This allows organizations to pivot their 
focus from low-level defense maneuvers like IP blacklisting and instead utilize wholistic 
defense measures that are tailored to the "why" of an adversary attack. 
  ATT&CK also maintains strong intelligence on known adversary groups and their 
targeted industries. Organizations can analyze which adversary groups pertain to their 
organizations, link their known tactics and techniques, and then proactively tailor their 
cyber defense to those strategies. This method of defense allows organizations to be 






4.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
  
Research Question 2 - Can open-source intelligence (OSINT) be a viable method for 
collecting and consuming cyber threat intelligence (CTI)? 
  
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is one of the most widely used forms of 
intelligence gathering. It also is one of the most available sources of intelligence and 
surrounds us both in the real and digital worlds. Being able to harness this vast array of 
information has many benefits and can be applied to a diverse set of solutions. 
  One of the key issues with OSINT is it can be represented in many different forms 
and is often not produced in formats that are easily consumable. Historically, OSINT 
needs to be manually sifted and analyzed by humans which typically causes it to be an 
inefficient and costly form of intelligence gathering. However, as the digital landscape 
and need for OSINT has evolved, so has the methods in which we can store, share, and 
consume it. 
  The Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) language provides a 
common format for organizations to share and consume threat intelligence. STIX is open 
source and free, which naturally eliminates any barrier of entry for those who want to 
contribute and consume. All aspects of threat intelligence can be represented through 
STIX data objects and can be visually represented for an analyst or stored as JSON to be 
machine readable. This openness allows for organizations to integrate into tools and 
solutions easily. It is because of these principles that STIX proves to be an excellent 





  While having STIX as an option for OSINT, it does not inherently prove that 
threat intelligence can still be effectively collected. This thesis proved this was possible 
by the ease at which intelligence was collected from MITRE's ATT&CK data repository. 
This data repository is the entirety of the ATT&CK intelligence framework all stored as 
STIX objects. By using STIX, ATT&CK was able to link all its threat intelligence 
research effectively to one another and easily consumable by anyone, globally. This 
thesis demonstrated the ease and effectiveness of the OSINT collection and serves as a 
demonstration of how organizations and entities can do the same. 
 
4.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
 
Research Question 3 - Can machine learning prove to be an accurate and efficient 
method for harnessing the benefits of a cyber threat intelligence ontology? 
  
Machine learning can be applied to solve many difficult and complex problems 
across a wide range of industries. These applications typically shine best when the 
problems at hand require a lot of manual intervention or analysis by a human. These are 
the current issues facing the cyber security landscape as there is such a large volume of 
data and not enough analysts to analyze and make decisions from the data. These factors 
are the recipe for a machine learning solution to be applied. However, this machine 
learning solution needs to be a tangible result for organizations to reach. A proper 
solution needs to be both accurate and effective for the problem at hand and needs to 





  This thesis focused on the applicability of consuming unstructured OSINT threat 
intelligence and leveraging machine learning models to be able to classify unknown 
unstructured OSINT threat intelligence. This thesis was able to demonstrate extremely 
accurate results while also comparing and visualizing the difference in model types. 
Further, this solution demonstrated that a large amount of data proved to not be an issue 
for the models as this solution dealt with thousands of artifacts of data of various types 
and was able to predict accurately with an average F1-score of 95%. These working 
demonstrations show that organizations can leverage machine learning, as well as natural 
language processing, to efficiently classifying threat intelligence. Further, this thesis 
showed that a machine learning model can be fed in training data that is cyber threat 
intelligence specific. Even further, this solution's datasets were collected from data 
sources that package their intelligence from real-world events, further emphasizing their 
applicability. Lastly, the machine learning model, aligned with MITRE ATT&CK, 
showed that a cyber threat intelligence ontology can be applied to solving complex 
problems within the cyber defense landscape. 
 
4.4 FUTURE WORK 
One of the core themes and foundations of the work of this thesis is data. While it is 
important for organizations to have a strong understanding of cyber threat intelligence 
principles and frameworks, realizing these principles into tangible and beneficial 
solutions is a daunting task. One of the key features of building better solutions is 
developing larger and more robust data collection pipelines. It is vital that more and more 





The work in this thesis can be further developed by utilizing more diverse and 
higher volumes of data. There is a growing amount of OSINT feeds being made available 
to the cyber security community. Examples of OSINT feeds include AlienVault’s Open 
Threat Exchange (AlienVault, 2021), the FBI’s InfraGard (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, n.d.), and FireEye’s Threat Intelligence solutions (FireEye, 2021). Further, 
custom tailored solutions can be developed as well by collecting intelligence using social 
media sites, dark web sites, and tools like Shodan (Shodan, 2021). 
Collecting more cyber threat intelligence data will increasingly make the machine 
learning model smarter and able to predict more accurately. Next, even more diverse 
datasets can be consumed by the solution. Collecting ATT&CK types from a diverse pool 
of data streams will allow the machine learning model to be built from a stronger 
foundation and can be applied to more diverse problems. 
Lastly, machine learning is one of the fastest growing fields within computer 
science. There are new libraries and strategies being released to the community which 
provide even more capabilities. It was not long ago that many of the ML libraries utilized 
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